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Breaking into the vault: Privacy, security and forensic analysis of
Android vault applications
Xiaolu Zhanga , Ibrahim Baggilia,∗, Frank Breitingera
a Cyber

Forensics Research & Education Group, Tagliatela College of Engineering, ECECS,
University of New Haven, 300 Boston Post Rd., West Haven, CT, 06516

Abstract
In this work we share the first account for the forensic analysis, security and privacy of Android vault applications.
Vaults are designed to be privacy enhancing as they allow users to hide personal data but may also be misused to
hide incriminating files. Our work has already helped law enforcement in the state of Connecticut to reconstruct 66
incriminating images and 18 videos in a single criminal case. We present case studies and results from analyzing
18 Android vault applications (accounting for nearly 220 million downloads from the Google Play store) by reverse
engineering them and examining the forensic artifacts they produce. Our results showed that 12⁄18 obfuscated their code
and 5⁄18 applications used native libraries hindering the reverse engineering process of these applications. However, we
still recovered data from the applications without root access to the Android device as we were able to ascertain hidden
data on the device without rooting for 10⁄18 of the applications. 6⁄18 of the vault applications were found to not encrypt
photos they stored, and 8⁄18 were found to not encrypt videos. 7⁄18 of the applications were found to store passwords in
cleartext. We were able to also implement a swap attack on 5⁄18 applications where we achieved unauthorized access to
the data by swapping the files that contained the password with a self-created one. In some cases, our findings illustrate
unfavorable security implementations of privacy enhancing applications, but also showcase practical mechanisms for
investigators to gain access to data of evidentiary value. In essence, we broke into the vaults.
Keywords: Forensics, Mobile applications, Privacy, Security, Vault Applications, Android.

1. Introduction
Mobile vault applications facilitate secure storage of personal data, preventing data leakage when a user’s device
is borrowed or lost. Some applications disguise themselves
by mimicking widely used programs such as a calculator.
Only when a user types in the correct passcode (like a
password), hidden data will be displayed. By searching
‘vault app’ in the Google Play Store, many vault applications can be found. At the time of writing, the most
downloaded vault application – AppLock had been downloaded over a hundred million times.
From a privacy perspective, vault applications can be
used to hide benign personal data (typically media files
such as pictures and videos). They have also been misused with criminal intent for hiding photos / videos of
victims. This means that they are also considered as antidigital forensic tools and fall under the data hiding category since they hinder the forensic process (Conlan et al.,
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2016). Furthermore, vault applications have been used by
minors to hide photos from their peers and parents. The
increased use of vault applications has brought challenges
for school systems as well as security and digital forensic
practitioners.
For example, in a 2015 case, high school students in Colorado exchanged hundreds of nude photos of themselves
(Colorado sexting scandal: High school faces felony investigation, 2016). Nearly half of the students in the incident hid their photos from their parents in a calculatorlike vault application. In another criminal case in December 2015, the Connecticut Glastonbury Police Department
(PD) investigated a report that a man had been observed
secretly taking pictures with his phone up the skirt of a
woman in an office building parking lot while he assisted
her with her vehicle. During the investigation, the suspect’s phone was received at the Connecticut Center for
Digital Investigations (CDI) for examination. The phone
was a Samsung Galaxy 6 Edge running Android. A logical and physical extraction were completed using what
most law enforcement regard as the golden standard tool
for mobile forensics: Cellebrite UFED 4PC. The data was
analyzed using Cellebrite’s Physical Analyzer. During the
analysis, it was noted that the suspect had been using several programs on the phone that were designed to hide files.
One of the programs in particular was titled GalleryVault.
August 2, 2017

With traditional forensic tools, the police were only able
to recover a few photos that were located on the device,
none of which were guarded by the vault applications.
It is of note that work presented in this paper was used
on the data hidden by the GalleryVault application. The
researchers collaborated with CDI and reconstructed 66
new files that were previously irrecoverable. These files
included 18 additional videos that would be prosecutable
in the Connecticut jurisdiction, as well as 38 videos that
may be prosecutable in other jurisdictions. All together,
42 new victims were revealed in these recovered videos
allowing the police to demonstrate the full scope of the
suspect’s actions, having a direct impact on the outcome
of the case. This showcased the importance of our research
findings to the law enforcement community.
Our work had two complementary goals. The first was
to test security implementations in vault applications to
examine their impact on privacy. The second was to explore the digital forensic implications of our findings. We
therefore conducted an investigation based on the logical acquisition of artifacts from vault applications complimented by (in most instances) reverse engineering the 18
most popular free vault applications which at the time of
writing amounted in total for over 219,500,000 downloads
from Google Play.
This work presents the following contributions:

and approaches for reverse engineering Android applications (Sec. 2.4).
2.1. Android acquisition methods
Readers familiar with mobile phone acquisition may
want to skip this section. Data acquisition can be achieved
both logically and physically. Logical acquisition extracts
user data recognized by the filesystem whereby deleted files
are excluded. Physical acquisition achieves a bit stream
copy of flash memory and all the data physically stored.
One approach for achieving logical acquisition is utilizing adb – an official Android versatile command line tool
(Android Debug Bridge — Android Studio, n.d.). With
this, user data can be transferred from the Android device
to a forensic workstation. However, establishing an adb
connection requires the target device to have Universal
Serial Buss (USB) debugging mode enabled. Additionally,
whether the data can be extracted relies on the established
user privilege.
Early research used adb to support physical acquisition
(Lessard and Kessler, 2010; Hoog, 2011). In these articles, achieving physical acquisition required root privilege
on the device to leverage an adb connection. Even though
Lessard and Kessler (2010) presented an approach for gaining root access, it is no longer wildly applicable for the new
generation of Android devices. In situations where root
privilege, an unlocked screen or enabled adb is unavailable, researchers achieved physical acquisition by flashing
a custom image to a recovery partition of an Android device (Vidas et al., 2011; Son et al., 2013). This was executed by rebooting the device to recovery mode to acquire
user data with minimal loss of integrity.
In recent work, Yang et al. (2015) discovered in the
firmware update protocol for different brands of Android
devices a flash memory read command. By reverse engineering the protocol in the bootloader, the researchers were
able to physically acquire the entire flash memory of the
device without gaining root privilege and unlocking the
screen.
While most acquisition typically happens using software, acquisition may also be achieved at the hardware
level and is usually substantially more intrusive to a device’s hardware. Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) and
chip-off are the most popular approaches (Breeuwsma
et al., 2007). JTAG leverages a testing port on a mobile
device and can be utilized by examiners to physically connect to a Printed Circuit Board (PCB), which is available
for variety Android devices (Kim et al., 2008). In Chip-off,
investigators detach the flash memory chip from the PCB
and acquire the data using specialized equipment (Hoog,
2011).

• Methods for breaking into 18 vault applications is presented in detail allowing the reconstruction of original
files hidden by most of the applications.
• The location and type of relevant forensic artifacts for
the 18 vault applications such as passwords (cleartext
and hashed), database files and encrypted and unencrypted media files.
• In 16⁄18 cases, we present ways to reconstruct or retrieve hidden files without the need to log into the
applications.
• Software tools for reconstructing / decrypting data
from some of the vault applications.
The rest of the paper presents related work in Sec. 2
followed by the apparatus used in Sec. 3. We share our
four-phase overarching methodology in Sec. 4. The core
of our work is presented in Sec. 5 with our case study and
findings for the 18 vault applications are portrayed. We
then follow up with Sec. 6 which summarizes our results
and findings. The discussion and limitation sections are
then presented in Sec. 8 and Sec. 9 respectively. We conclude and set directions for future work in Sec. 10.
2. Background information & related work

2.2. Application artifact analysis
Other Android research focused on recovering and exploring application artifacts. Much of the work has focused
on Instant Messenger (IM) applications that provide evidence of interpersonal communications. IMs such as Wickr

We review related work in four major areas: methods
for Android data acquisition (Sec. 2.1), artifact analysis of popular messaging and social networking applications (Sec. 2.2), Android application privacy (Sec. 2.3)
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and ChatON on Android have been subjected to artifact
analysis (Mehrotra and Mehtre, 2013; Iqbal et al., 2013).
Other work also focused on extracting GPS geodata from
all applications on an experimental Android device (Maus
et al., 2011) or target specific mobile navigation applications like Google maps or Waze (Jason Moore, 2016). Earlier work on mobile phones by Husain and Sridhar (2009)
also forensically examined the iPhone messaging applications: AIM, Yahoo! Messenger and Google Talk. They
were able to recover potential evidence such as usernames
and passwords. Similar work was conducted on multiple
Android devices where WhatsApp and Viber were examined (Mahajan et al., 2013).
Past research also examined the security of nine VoIP
and messaging applications on both iOS and Android
(Schrittwieser et al., 2012). Results indicated that in
most tested applications, vulnerabilities could be exploited
to hijack accounts, enumerate subscribers and more.
Anglano (2014) fully analyzed artifacts acquired from
WhatsApp Messenger, which included several database
files (e.g. contacts database, chat database etc.) and sent
or received media files. Unclear data was decoded and interpreted. Sahu (2013) applied data acquisition and analysis on both non-volatile and volatile memory for WhatsApp. They were able to retrieve artifacts such as contacts,
location, media files and messages.
In other recent work, Karpisek et al. (2015) were able to
decrypt WhatsApp’s network traffic and examined the new
voice call signaling protocol. They were able to identify
and visualize the messages exchanged between the client
and server as well as the audio codec used.
Social networking applications have also been studied
by forensic / security researchers. For instance, the widely
used social networking applications: Facebook, Twitter
and MySpace were forensically analyzed (Al Mutawa et al.,
2012). Walnycky et al. (2015) conducted forensic analysis
on 20 popular Android social messaging applications by
capturing the applications’ network traffic as well as examining the data they stored. Lastly, Saltaformaggio et al.
(2016) were also able to recover multiple previous screens
of a terminated application on an Android device from a
memory image.
In summary, mobile application analysis has attracted
attention. However, past scientific work was limited to
application artifacts or network traffic of messaging applications. At the time of writing, there were minimal
exploratory attempts aimed at examining the security of
some vault applications presented in blog entries (David
Auerbach, 2015; E2e, 2016; Gary Hawkins, 2012). Some
of these early results are outdated. More importantly, the
blog entries only scratched the surface in exploring the
strength of data protection in vault applications and the
practitioners did not reverse engineer the applications at
the source code level - thus our findings are more comprehensive and rigorous. For example, the authors were unable to retrieve encrypted data from Private Photo Vault
(Table 1), whereas our work was unable to recover th data

protected by that application. It is also of note that at
the time of writing, no scientific papers have paid attention to vault applications. Given their wide adoption, our
work fills that literature gap. Since our study focused on
a specific types of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET)
– vault applications – literature pertaining to Android application privacy is of relevance to our inquiry.
2.3. Android application privacy
Other than forensic related literature, the privacy leakage / security issues of Android applications have inspired
an active body of research. Past work in this area focused
on potential attacks for leaking private user data. Work
by Jana and Shmatikov (2012) illustrated a side-channel
attack by tracking changes in an application’s memory
footprint. They showed that using a concurrent process
belonging to a different user can grab an application’s secrets. They used web browsers as an application target
and illustrated how an unprivileged, local attack process
e.g., a malicious Android application can infer the page
the user is browsing as well as finer-grained information
like if the user is a paid customer, interests, etc. This
motivated studies on the automatic detection of privacy
leakage from Android applications. For example, AppAudit merged static and dynamic analysis to provide effective real-time Android application auditing by simulating
the execution of part of the program and performing customized checks at each program state (Xia et al., 2015).
Tools such as AndroidLeaks and AppIntent focused on
detecting a user’s information privacy leakage. Even
though Android applications are sandboxed, vulnerabilities were identified that allowed applications to gain the capabilities of other applications, and DroidChecker was the
tool created to detect those vulnerable applications (Gibler
et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2013; Chan et al., 2012). Taming
Information-Stealing Smartphone Applications (on Android) or TISSA extended a new privacy mode on Android to prevent information stealing from applications
(Zhou et al., 2011). By tracking the information transferred in the control flow, Static Analyzer for Detecting
Privacy Leaks in Android Applications SCANDAL was
also designed for privacy leak detection (Kim et al., 2012).
Secure Password Tracking for Android SpanDex, however,
was created to ensure that passwords do not leak from
Android applications by creating a set of extensions to
Android’s Dalvik virtual machine (Cox et al., 2014).
There exists abundant literature on the detection of privacy leakage from Android applications, and although this
body of knowledge is relevant to our work, it is not fully
applicable. Since our work focused on reversing vault applications to understand their security implementations,
and since every security implementation is different, we
had to revert to manual analysis and reverse engineering
techniques. This is why tools and techniques for Android
application analysis and reverse engineering is of strong
relevance our work.
3

2.4. Android application analysis
The purpose for statically analyzing the source code of
or reverse engineering an Android application is to provide
a comprehensive understanding of its inner workings. As
Android applications are programmed in JAVA, different
methods can decompile the compiled JAVA code (Dalvik
bytecode) into a human-readable representation. The human readable code is typically in the form of JAVA source
code or smali code.
Enck et al. (2011) presented a step-by-step tutorial for
converting the Dalvik bytecode to JAVA source code,
where the tool ded (ded Homepage, n.d.) converts the
Dalvik bytecode into JAVA bytecode (.jar, .class) and
the tool Soot (A framework for analyzing and transforming
Java and Android Applications, n.d.) decompiled JAVA
bytecode to JAVA source code. Gibler et al. (2012) utilized other tools with similar functions – dex2jar (dex2jar,
2016) similar to ded and – JD-GUI (JD-GUI A Java Decompiler, n.d.) – similar to Soot but with a Graphical User
Interface (GUI). Another possibility is to convert Dalvik
bytecode to smali code which is an assembly-like representation based on Jasmin syntax (Jasmin User Guide, n.d.).
The tools to achieve this are Apktool (Apktool - A tool for
reverse engineering Android apk files, n.d.) and smali/baksamli (smali/baksamli, 2016). If the analysis encompasses
a large sample of Android applications, an open source
parser called Rapid Android Parser for Investigating DEX
files (RAPID) can effectively reduce the processing time
(Zhang et al., 2016).
As Android applications can call native libraries1 ,
the well-known commercial tool Interactive Disassembler
(IDA) Pro (IDA pro, n.d.) may be used for their analysis. The benefits of using IDA Pro are the disassemble
and debug functions for both APK files and native libraries
followed by the function of converting assembly code to Clike pseudocode. Note that IDA Pro is not limited to low
level Android application analysis and may be used for disassembling Windows and other types of executables. Acar
et al. (2016) also pointed out, due to the fact that most
Android developers are likely to use existing open source
code / libraries, insecure implementations and vulnerabilities may be inherited. Other work by Bläsing et al. (2010)
proposed a sandbox for conducting dynamic analysis of
Android applications. However, dynamic analysis was not
employed in our work. To go over all the tools and techniques that foster Android application analysis is beyond
this paper’s scope. One may explore work by Faruki et al.
(2015) to survey the various tools.

applications was a GalaxyS4 mobile phone, model number SAMSUNG-SGH-I537, system version 5.0.1 and kernel
version 3.4.0-4554112. An acquisition workstation connected to the phone via USB running Microsoft Windows
8.1 was employed. Even though root access may not always be a prerequisite for acquisition of potential artifacts
(see Sec. 6), user privilege on the device was maximized in
order to locate necessary files and artifacts; the GalaxyS4
was rooted and USB debugging mode was enabled. Other
tools were configured on the acquisition workstation. adb
was used to connect the forensic workstation to the Android device for acquiring relevant vault application artifacts. ApkTool and IDA Pro were used in reverse engineering the Android applications and a SQLite Browser (DB
Browser for SQLite, n.d.) was used for exploring SQLite
database files (SQLite Home Page, n.d.).
4. Methodology
To verify if an Android vault application was able to
protect a user’s personal files, the testing was divided into
four phases: scenario creation, data acquisition, case analysis and tool development.
4.1. Scenario creation
The purpose of this phase was to simulate real user data
on the Android device. Therefore, the 18 most popular free
vault applications were downloaded from the Android official application market – Google Play store. Appendix 1
shows the official name, name on the device and package
name of the downloaded applications.
As soon as the vault applications were installed, we took
photos (.jpg) and videos (.mp4) with clearly numbered
identifiers (in each image / video) for each application
and stored them in each ‘vault’. We had to also initially
set up passwords / passcodes on the vault applications.
For the application Keeper (No. 4 in Appendix 1), we
set the password ‘951234’ since it required a minimum 6
character password. All other vault applications were configured with the same four digit password – 9512. This
was chosen because it was a forced requirement to have
a maximum of four digits for some of the applications –
so we opted to standardize the password (as much as possible) across all of our testing. We also configured the
same 9 pointer pattern lock – 0124678 (if that option was
available) which represented the gesture of the letter ‘Z’.
Finally, when applicable, we set up the recovery e-mail
‘vaultapptest@gmail.com’, and the security answer ‘3’
with the security question ‘What is your favorite number?’
to applications that implemented a password recovery feature.

3. Apparatus
This section outlines the apparatus used in our testing. The Android device used when installing the vault

4.2. Data acquisition
1A

native library for an Android application is also known as a
.so (Shared Object) file which is usually compiled by C / C++ code
and only executed on the structure of Central Processing Unit (CPU)
of mobile devices.

To explore potential artifacts that may be utilized for
breaking into the vault applications, two key items (listed
in the following paragraphs) for each application were
4

pulled from the Android device to the acquisition workstation (more on how this was accomplished over the adb
is discussed later in this section).

4.3. Analysis
Once the artifacts were extracted from the Android
device, we sequentially analyzed each vault application
through artifact analysis and executable code reverse engineering. Executable code analysis was primarily employed
when the security implementation was needed in order to
gain access to encrypted material stored in the vault application.
Artifact analysis was carried out manually by exploring the acquired data. During exploration, meaningful artifacts such as labels in Extensible Markup Language (XML) files (e.g. <string name="password">),
column names in SQLite files (e.g. aeskey) or obvious
folder / file names (e.g. /sdcard/.EncryptedFolder)
were noted. Some findings became 1) Direct artifacts
e.g. unencrypted photos / videos or passwords found in
cleartext and 2) Indirect artifacts such as hashed passwords or files suspected to be the encrypted photos and
videos.
Executable code analysis was employed mainly if all
artifacts retrieved through our analysis were deemed
indirect. We focused on reverse engineering the APK
files. Precisely, we disassembled APK files into smali
code. By employing manual code analysis, we were able
to retrieve 1) Artifacts missed by our primary artifact
analysis, where access to information or hidden media
files were stored and 2) The security implementations for
authentication / authorization or data hiding. This allowed us to understand how to reconstruct hidden data
and explore methods of decrypting encrypted data.

App-generated folders which are folders created by the
application on the Android filesystem. We hypothesized
that some files may contain hidden photos and videos,
user passwords or other forensically relevant application
artifacts that may help us break into the vaults.
APK files which are Android Application Packages.
These files contain installer files for each of the vault
applications and are an important resource for reverse
engineering the executable code.
Precisely, for each vault application, three folders on the
Android system were generally targeted during our data
acquisition:
/data/app/package name which is a root user accessible folder that stores the APK file of each application.
‘package name’ refers to the package name of each application (see Appendix 1 for the package names).
/data/data/package name is another folder accessible
for root users that stores the private data / artifacts for
each application.
/sdcard which is the folder for the mounted Secure Digital (SD) card physically located in the Android device. In our tests, we found different paths that pointed
to the same folder such as: /storage/emulated/0,
/storage/emulated/legacy and /mnt/sdcard.
It is important to note that in our work, acquisition
was accomplished logically. We did not focus on deleted
data as we were looking for low hanging fruit artifacts
allowing us to break into each of the vault applications
and reconstruct hidden files2 . For each vault application, we employed the pull command in the adb tool to
extract the following folders: /data/app/package_name,
/data/data/package_name and /sdcard. To replicate
our work, one may use the commands presented in the
following steps:

4.4. Tool development
Based on our findings, we constructed software tools if
breaking into the vault application required such implementations to aid in the reconstruction and decryption of
vault-stored data. We posit that developing these tools
is necessary to assist investigators in the recovery of potential evidence they might have missed. We note that
these tools are not shared publicly and are provided
on need basis, after the identity of the requesting
party is vetted.

Step 1: The command chmod [OPTION] <MODE> <FILE>
was used to modify the assigned folders to a normal user
accessible under a root user’s access.
Step 2: The command adb pull [-p] [-a] <remote>
[<local>] was used to acquire the folders mentioned
above.

5. Case study and findings
In this section, we present a comprehensive case study
and findings that entail each of the 18 vault applications
shown in Table 1. The subsections follow the ordering of
the table starting with the most prominent application.
Each case details the results from our analysis augmented
by an approach for recovering hidden photos / videos. It
is of note that we attempted two major methods to gain
access to data stored by the vault applications. The first
focused on finding ways of recovering media files from data
acquired directly from the phone – which is usually more
relevant to forensic investigations. The second focused
on gaining unauthorized access to the vault applications

The resultant data from the acquisition process for each
vault application is referenced in the case study in Sec. 5.
Note that although data acquisition was achieved via adb,
other methods to pull data from the aforementioned folders may be employed as well.

2 It is of note that more research needs to be conducted to analyze
how the media (images and videos) are stored by the vault applications in case data is copied and then deleted from the device, thus,
there may be potential evidence residing on the device’s storage when
physical acquisition is employed.
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Application
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Table 1: Most downloaded Android vault applications.
Name on device
package name

AppLock
LEO Privacy-Applock,Hide,Safe
Vault-Hide SMS, Pics & Videos
Keeper®: Free Password Manager
Hide Pictures Keep Safe Vault
Hide Pictures &Videos - Vaulty
Gallery Vault - Hide Pictures
Hide Photos, Video-Hide it Pro
Hide Photos in Photo Locker
Video Locker - Hide Videos
LOCX Applock Lock Apps & Photo
Secret AppLock for Android
Pic Lock- Hide Photos & Videos
HidePhoto
Hide Pictures PhotoSafe Vault
Private Photo Vault
Calculator Vault- Gallery Lock
Private Text Messaging & Calls

AppLock
LEO Privacy
Vault
Keeper
Keepsafe
Vaulty
GalleryVault
Audio Manager
Photo Locker
Video Locker
LOCX
Secret AppLock
Pic Lock
HidePhoto
PhotoSafe
Private Photo Vault
Calculator
Coverme

com.domobile.applock
com.leo.appmaster
com.netqin.ps
com.callpod.android_apps.keeper
com.kii.safe
com.theronrogers.vaultyfree
com.thinkyeah.galleryvault
com.hideitpro
com.handyapps.photoLocker
com.handyapps.videolocker
com.cyou.privacysecurity
com.amazing.secreateapplock
com.xcs.piclock
com.domobile.hidephoto
com.slickdroid.vaultypro
com.enchantedcloud.photovault
com.calculator.vault
ws.coverme.im

Version

Downloads

2.16.3
3.7.7
6.4.22.22
10.1.2
7.3.1
4.3.3
2.9.1
5.4
1.2.1
1.2.1
2.3.1.013
6.9
1.9
1.9
2.0.1
1.8.3
8.5
2.6.4

100,000,000+
50,000,000+
10,000,000+
10,000,000+
10,000,000+
5,000,000+
5,000,000+
5,000,000+
5,000,000+
5,000,000+
5,000,000+
5,000,000+
1,000,000+
1,000,000+
1,000,000+
500,000+
500,000+
500,000+

value of the tag is image lock pattern to true by modifying file com.domobile.applock preferences.xml. As
long as the pattern lock was activated, examiners can swap
the original value in tag image lock pattern in the same
XML file with a new one that was created by encoding the
SHA1 hash value of a new gesture to Base64 format. For
example, the value agYrmzRS42ZAcYGhv5Lqc+ntTEg= is
the hash value for a 7 byte hex value 0x00, 0x01, 0x02,
0x04, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08 which represents gesture ‘Z’
(every byte maps to 0 - 8 points of the pattern lock). This
will allow an examiner to log into the application using
the newly created gesture. If the gesture was set previously, another option was to decode the Based64 value
in the tag image lock pattern in the file com.domobile.
applock_preferences.xml. For instance, in our case, the
value was agYrmzRS42ZAcYGhv5Lqc+ntTEg=. When decoded with Base64, it became a 20 byte SHA1 hash value
– 6a062b9b3452e366407181a1bf92ea73e9ed4c48. This
hash was easily broken using a rainbow table attack and
revealed the original byte sequence / pattern representing
the gesture ‘Z’.

through various attack vectors. To ensure the reader’s
comprehension of the 18 vault application examinations,
we wanted to reinforce the following terms used throughout the case study:
Folder “shared prefs” represents the folder that is located in /data/data/package_name for the vault applications.
Swap attack is a method in which an examiner can swap
an assigned value in a certain file with a self-created one
in order to reset the password, gesture for login or the
status of an application (e.g. switch on / off the pattern
lock).
Password attacks which represents a variety of attacks
against application passwords and gestures. In some
instances, a rainbow table attack was used. In other instances, a brute force attack was used. Generally, these
password attacks helped us in identifying the passwords
used to access the application. In many of the applications, the password space was low (4-6 characters), and
sometimes limited to digits, making a brute force attack
a practical option.

5.2. LEO Private 3.7.7
The first weakness we found in LEO Private is the
storage of the password which was found in cleartext in
shared_settings.xml in the shared_prefs folder tagged
with password. Thus, if the phone is active, an examiner can log into the application using the mobile phone
directly. If the phone is unavailable, we observed that
the photo and video were stored and treated differently.
The video was still stored in the original folder /sdcard/
DCIM/Camera without any encryption. In order to hide
video files, LEO Private only changed the file extension
to ‘.leotmi’. Photos were actually encrypted and stored
in /sdcard/.DefaultGallery/DCIM/Camera with the extension ‘.leotmi’ as well. Having a closer look showed
that the encryption / decryption is packed in the native
library /lib/armeabi-v7a/libLeoImage.so. The library

5.1. AppLock 2.16.3
Our artifact analysis showed that AppLock stored unencrypted pictures and videos in separate folders under
/sdcard/.MySecurityData/dont_remove. The folders
were named with different random strings / hash value.
In each folder, the photos / videos were stored in the subfolder .video / .image respectively. Also, the application stored the Base64 encoded Secure Hash Algorithm 1
(SHA1) hash value of the gesture for the pattern lock in the
XML file com.domobile.applock_preferences.xml in
the application’s shared_prefs folder. Even though this
approach was available only if the pattern lock of the application was activated, the pattern lock can be activated
either by a previous user or an examiner can swap the
6

runs the eXtended Tiny Encryption Algorithm (XTEA) to
encrypt the first 1024 bytes of the photo where the Key is
hard coded into the library. To decode, one can either call
the function leo decrypt v1(const char *a1) or copy
the encrypted files to /sdcard/.DefaultGallery/DCIM/
Camera on another device that has LEO Private installed
(regardless of the actual user password).

The left side of Fig. 1 shows the login process which is
handled in a similar manner. Again, the data is stored in
the setting table where column ‘name’ = ‘enc pass’. The
content of the cell (marked in red) consists of a 22 bytes
randomly generated Salt-2, and the 31 bytes Base64 encoded password hash. Hash and Salt-2 are both encoded
with bcrypt - an open source library (Provos and Mazieres,
1999). Note, while Fig. 1 shows the actual names of the
encrypting / decrypting functions, Keeper used obfuscation techniques and hence the function names were different. Names in the figure are based on the open source
bcrypt.java (BCrypt source code, n.d.). Also note that
bcrypt uses its own encoding and decoding implementation for Base64.
In order to attack this algorithm, a brute force attack
can be implemented as follows:
Step 1: Decode the Salt that was encoded as the second
part of the highlighted string in Fig. 1 with the function
decode base64(..) of bcrypt.java.
Step 2: Hash the attempted password with the function
crypt raw(..) and compare the result with the third
part of the highlighted string. The correct password can
be acquired if the values match.
Given that there is no limitation on the password length
or complexity, the success rate depends on the chosen password.

5.3. Vault 6.4.22.22
Vault stored the encrypted content in the directory
/sdcard/SystemAndroid/Data/MTc1MDU4OQ==
which
contained two subfolders named .video and .image.
Inside these subfolders, we found our target files with
.bin extensions. Note, the Data folder contained several
Base64 encoded folders. The only one of relevance in our
testing was the MTc1MDU4OQ== folder. While analyzing
the application source code, we found that Vault only
encrypts the first 80 bytes of each media file by using
a repeating single byte which will be referred to as
B. In order to retrieve B, we utilized the file header
information, e.g. in case of JPEG it is 0xFFD8, which
revealed that B = 0x3D. In other words, to decrypt the
videos and images, one simply has to XOR 0x3D against
the first 80 bytes. An interesting side note is that Vault
takes and stores a picture every time someone enters
an incorrect password. These pictures are stored in
/sdcard/SystemAndroid/Data/LTIxMDY4ODk5OTA= and
uses the identical encryption mechanism (XOR) but with
B = 0xFA.

5.5. Keepsafe 7.3.1
This application stored the cleartext password in the
value of tag master-password of XML file com.kii.safe_
preferences.xml in the application’s shared prefs
folder. Thus, investigators can simply read the file and
then log in. Having a closer look revealed that the photos and videos were renamed with a hash value (we did
not investigate this further as it is not relevant for decrypting the files) and stored encrypted data in subfolders of /sdcard/.keepsafe/manifests/primary. Each
subfolder was named using the first 2 letters of the
file, e.g., subfolder 2e stored the encrypted media file
2e3c1f4aa10da568c5a26251457 79ad01163acc8. The en
/ decryption functions were found in a native library in
/lib/armeabi-v7a/libcrypt_user.so of the APK file of
the application. An overview of the encryption mechanism
is provided in Fig. 2 employing the following three major
steps:
Step 1: The media file is divided into blocks of 16,384
bytes of data (the last block was equal to or smaller
than 16384).
Step 2: Every block was then encrypted using the same
encryption method, Initialization Vector (IV) and password. The size remained identical.
Step 3: Once all the blocks were encrypted, an Initialization Block (block zero) is added to the beginning of the
media file which has a constant size of 3728 bytes. This
block starts with Keepsafe’s logo (3711 bytes), 16 byte
IV and a one byte terminator. If a user clicks on any of

5.4. Keeper 10.1.2
Out of all 18 applications, we deemed Keeper as the
most secure. We were not able to reconstruct the original
content except by employing a brute force attack on the
password hash. Although we could not gain unauthorized
login into the application, we will explain our findings as
well as how to retrieve the hash value of the password.
In contrast to many other applications, Keeper organizes
its metadata in a SQLite database instead of XML which
can be found in /data/data/com.callpod.android_
apps.keeper/databases/vaultapptest@gmail.com.sql
where the e-mail address became the username during
installation. The most important table in the database
was setting (shown in Fig. 1). On the other hand, the
encrypted content can be found in /data/data/com.
callpod.android_apps.keeper/cache/record_files.
The actual encryption scheme is best explained in Fig. 1
where we will focus on the right side first. Keeper uses
Key-1 in order to encrypt all images / videos which is created by SecureRandom() when the application is initialized. This Key-1 is encrypted using Key-2 which is generated from the user password, a Salt-1 and IterationCount.
Salt-1, IterationCount and encrypted Key-1 can be found
in the ‘setting str’ column when the column ‘name’ =
‘encryption params’ and is stored in a BLOB data type.
The BLOB is separated into 1 byte for Mode, 3 bytes for
IterationCount, 16 bytes for Salt-1 and 80 bytes for Key-1.
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Figure 1: The decryption procedure for media ﬁles in Keeper.

returns the original name of the media ﬁle, the path of
the deconstructed media ﬁles and the 10 bytes of wiped
data for each ﬁle.
Step 2: After identifying the correct ﬁle by using the
name and path, the ﬁrst 10 bytes of the ﬁle was replaced
with its original header.
If the phone is active, one may also perform a swap
attack on the MD5 or SHA1 values which can be found in
Kidd.xml in shared_prefs tagged LockPin. It remained
unclear why the developers decided to store a 72 hex string
value in this ﬁeld which consists of the MD5 hash (32 hex
characters) followed by the SHA1 hash (40 hex characters).

the encrypted ﬁles, Keepsafe’s logo would appear faking
an average user to think that it is a PNG logo ﬁle.
The
decryption
is
performed
with
the
processBlock(..)
function in the native library which needs the Key and the IV. While the
Key is stored in the Initialization Block (block
zero), the 32 byte Key can be found in tag
aec5a0aa33e25e4c9108939f6d6292c4507b045eAe of the
com.kii.safe.secmanager.xml ﬁle in shared_prefs.
Once all encrypted blocks were decrypted using the
processBlock(..) function, the Initialization Block was
ﬁnally removed from the encrypted media ﬁle to recover
the ﬁle to its original state.

5.8. Audio Manager 5.4
This vault application disguised itself as an audio
manager on the device.
Once a user holds a tap
on the logo at the top of the screen, the real application is activated.
Audio manager stored unencrypted photos and videos separately in the subfolder New
Album of folder Pictures and Videos under /sdcard/
ProgramData/Android/Language/.fr/. Also, the cleartext password was found in tag password of XML ﬁle com.
hideitpro_preferences.xml in shared_prefs. Note
that New Album is the default name of the album storing
the hidden ﬁles, which may be customized by users.

5.6. Vaulty 4.3.3
Vaulty’s media ﬁles were found in /sdcard/Documents/
Vaulty/data but with a new ﬁle extension ‘.vdata’. The
videos were unencrypted. Vaulty additionally prepends
the word ‘obscured’ (0x6F, 0x62, 0x73, 0x63, 0x75,
0x72, 0x65, 0x64) to the photos’ header. Thus, removing the ‘obscured’ string and changing the ﬁle extension allows swift recovery of the pictures. The password of the application was stored as a Message Digest
5 (MD5) hash value in tag password hash of the XML
ﬁle com.theronrogers.vaultyfree_preferences.xml in
share_prefs. Similar to case 1 in Sec. 5.1, examiners can
either adopt a swap attack or a rainbow attack on the hash
value.

5.9. Photo Locker 1.2.1 & Video Locker 1.2.1
Photo Locker and Video Locker were released by the
same developer. These two applications adopted the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm to store the
password. For the media ﬁles, they utilized AES to encrypt the ﬁrst 16384 bytes. As shown in Fig. 3, a hardcoded string "HANDY APPShandyapps@gmail.com" was
found which was utilized to generate the secret Key object – Key-1 (object javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec
in JAVA SDK) for an AES algorithm.
Key-1 can
then be used for decrypting the AES-encrypted system
e-mail address which was stored in label SECRET KEY
of XML ﬁle com.handyapps.photoLocker_preferences.
xml for Photo Locker or com.handyapps.videolocker_
preferences.xml for Video Locker in the shared prefs

5.7. GalleryVault 2.9.1
In order to hide photos and videos, GalleryVault
deconstructed them under /sdcard/.galleryvault_
DoNotDelete_1466617307/file/ where the ﬁrst 10 bytes
were overwritten with 0x00 and placed the original 10
bytes in a database. To reconstruct the ﬁles, one may
simply query the database, identify the correct ﬁle and
replace the header with the following steps:
Step 1: Query the database ﬁle /sdcard/galleryvault_
DoNotDelete_146610307/backup/galleryvault.db
using
‘Select name, path, org file header blob
FROM file’ to retrieve the original header string. This
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Figure 2: The decryption procedure for media ﬁles in Keepsafe.

Therefore, the video can be reconstructed by adding the
last 524,288 bytes of .enc 14670617949374302.mp4 to the
beginning of the deconstructed video and then XORing
each of the 524,288 bytes with 0x6E. Lastly, we found
the MD5 hash value of the password in the tag pinp
of ﬁle com.cyou.privacysecurity_preferences.xml under the application’s shared prefs folder.

folder. The e-mail is the input for generating the second Key object Key-2 which is utilized for protecting the
password and media ﬁles. The encrypted password was
found as the ﬁrst line in ﬁle /sdcard/.PL/.config for
Photo Locker and ﬁle /sdcard/.VL/.config for Video
Locker.
The media ﬁles were stored for these two
applications in folder /sdcard/.PL/Private Photo and
/sdcard/.VL/Private Video respectively. Reusing Key
2 while adopting AES allowed us to decrypt and recover
the media ﬁles.

5.11. Secret AppLock 6.9
Secret AppLock stored unencrypted photos and videos
in folder /sdcard/.PixnArt12/.Photos and /sdcard/
.PixnArt12/.Videos. It also stored the cleartext of the
password in tag pin of XML ﬁle ApplockPreferences.
xml in the shared_prefs folder. Note that once the user
typed in an incorrect password, photos would be taken
from the front and back cameras and stored in folder
/sdcard/.hackImages. This is forensically important because investigators may note who was trying to break into
the vault application, but may also be useful for reasons
to validate the integrity of the collected digital evidence.

5.10. LOCX 2.3.1.013
LOCX stored the media ﬁles in the hidden
folder /sdcard/.EncryptedFolder.
The image ﬁle
.enc 14668978236175365.jpg and the video ﬁle
.2683375985d8b519e43a1fcf5e86c95c.mp4
were
stored in that folder.
Our code analysis revealed
that 2683375985d8b519e43a1fcf5e86c95c is the MD5
hash value for the path of the original video. For example,
in this case, the path was /storage/emulated/0/DCIM/
Camera/20160627_102536.mp4. To protect the images,
LOCX prepends the original path as hex to the image
header followed by 4 0x0s. The actual image is then
XORed with the constant 0x7B for every single byte.
To recover a photo, one simply removes the prepended
information and XORs again.
On the other hand, the video ﬁle was handled diﬀerently. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst 524,288 bytes (0x80000) of
the video were moved to the end of another created ﬁle
by the vault application. Once the 524,288 bytes were
moved, they were simply replaced with 0x0s. We note
that each of the 524,288 bytes inside the created ﬁle was
XORed with the constant value 0x6E. The content of the
created video ﬁle included the ﬁle path of the deconstructed video ﬁle with a thumbnail of the video. From our
testing, we located .enc 14670617949374302.mp4. Since
inside .enc 14670617949374302.mp4 we can observe the
path of the deconstructed video ﬁle, we were able to
hash the path of the deconstructed ﬁle, and locate the
ﬁle name with same hash value (similar to the example
shared above). This process allowed us to match the
deconstructed video ﬁle with the vault application created ﬁle necessary for the reconstruction of the video.

5.12. Pic Lock 1.9
Identical to the previous application, all information is simply hidden but not encrypted. The photos and videos were found in the subfolder of Photos
and Videos in the folder /sdcard/.AndroidLibs/
33e75ff09dd601bbe69f351039152189/.SafeBox1. Note,
the random string / hash value might change for diﬀerent
devices / new installations. Additionally, we found the
password in tag pass of XML ﬁle Password.xml in the
shared_prefs folder.
5.13. HidePhoto 1.9
HidePhoto stored the unencrypted photos and
videos in folder /sdcard/.MySecurityData2/dont_
remove/68d30a9594728bc39aa24be94b319d21/.image
and
/sdcard/.MySecurityData2/dont_remove/
d82c8d1619ad8176d665453cfb2e55f0/.video,
respectively.
The subfolders in folder dont_remove
were generated for diﬀerent media ﬁles, which were
labeled with random strings / hash values.
Moreover, this application stored the MD5 hash value
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Figure 3: Media ﬁle and password decryption in Photo Locker and Video Locker.

(b) The value of tag enc keys pin. After obtaining
these two pieces, examiners can reuse the function
Crypto.getCipherInputStream(..) to acquire the data
stream of the decrypted media ﬁle.

of the password in tag password of XML ﬁle
com.domobile.hidephoto preferences.xml
in
the
shared prefs folder.
Thus, examiners can achieve
unauthorized access by swapping the hash value in tag
password or utilizing a password attack (see Sec. 5.1).

5.16. Calculator 8.5
5.14. PhotoSafe 2.0.1

This application disguised itself as a calculator on the
system. Only when as user typed in the correct password the vault function is activated. The application
stored the unencrypted photos and videos in Pictures and
Videos in folder /data/data/com.calculator.vault/
files/locker1762. Therefore, the only protection for the
photos and videos was storing them in the folder that only
root user can open. Additionally, the cleartext password
was stored in tag mpass of XML ﬁle com.calculator.
vault_preferences.xml in the shared prefs folder.

PhotoSafe stored the cleartext of the password in tag
password of ﬁle vaultypro.xml in the shared prefs
folder. On the other hand, the application protected
photos and videos using a similar approach discussed
in Sec. 5.3. In subfolders images and videos under
/sdcard/.photosafe_DoNotDelete/camera, the ﬁrst 10
bytes of the photos and videos were XORed with the constant value 0xE7.
5.15. Private Photo Vault 1.8.3

5.17. Coverme 2.6.4

Private Photo Vault stored the SHA1 hash of
the password in com.enchantedcloud.photovault_
preferences.xml in the application’s shared prefs
folder with the tag pin. Since the password is limited to
four digits, it can be easily brute forced. On the other
hand, a swap attack is not possible as the application
employs the password for encryption.
As shown in Fig. 4, the application utilized the Facebook open source library Conceal to perform the encryption and decryption of the ﬁles. Employing the decryption function Crypto.getCipherInputStream(..) in
the library required a secret Key object – Key-1 (object
javax.crypto.SecretKey in JAVA SDK) that is highlighted in red in Fig. 4. Based on our code analysis,
Key-1 can be acquired by decrypting the Base64 decoded
value of tag enc keys pin in ﬁle com.enchantedcloud.
photovault_preferences.xml. The password used to
log into the application is used to create the Key object
javax.crypto.spec.DESKeySpec. This Key can be used
for decrypting the value of tag enc keys pin.
Therefore, in order to bypass the login and recover
encrypted photos and videos stored in folder /data/data/
com.enchantedcloud.photovault/files/media/orig,
some data was needed which included (a) The correct password (acquired using a password attack) and

For Coverme artifact analysis did not yield any results
and therefore all our ﬁndings are based on analysis of
the source code. Fig. 5 illustrates the encryption method
adopted by the application from a high level perspective.
Coverme applied triple-encryption for achieving the security of the media ﬁles and the password, where three different Keys were created.
Key-1 was created using the password when the user ﬁrst
signed up. The application stored the hash value of Key1 in column password of table kexinuser in the SQLite
database kexin.db which is stored in /data/data/ws.
coverme.im/databases/.
Key-2 was created based on both the password and random bytes which were inﬂuenced by the current system time. Key 2 was encrypted using Key-1 and resultant ciphertext was stored in column aeskey of table
kexinuser in the same database.
Key-3 was the Key utilized for the encryption of the media ﬁles. It was created using the password and random
bytes. The application stored the ciphertext of Key
3 which was encrypted using Key 2. The ciphertext
was stored in column keyByte of table localAesKey in
database ﬁle kexin.db.
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Figure 4: Media ﬁle decryption in Private Photo Vault.

On the other hand, 5⁄18 and 4⁄18 applications stored deconstructed photos and videos respectively by wiping data
from the header, conducting a simple computation or storing partial data in other ﬁles. Comparatively, 7⁄18 applications actually encrypted the Photo, which we considered a more secure implementation. However, in the four
cases tagged with H in Table 2, the encryption was implemented insecurely because the information for creating
the Key that was used for encrypting the photos was hard
coded in source code. The same issue was found in 3⁄6 applications that stored encrypted videos. We expected to
recover the photos and videos for most of the 18 applications from the logical data we acquired. However, in some
cases, if the recovery was more time consuming, or diﬃcult to accomplish, we took the second best alternative of
retrieving or swapping the password to recover the media
ﬁles through unauthorized logins. As Table 2 shows, 7⁄18
vault applications (marked in column C) stored the password in cleartext on the Android device. The other 8⁄18 applications stored the hash value of the password where we
were able to adopt a swap attack (marked as S ), rainbow
table attack (marked as R ) or brute force attack (marked
as B ).

Coverme’s encryption implementation(Fig. 5), is relatively secure when compared to most of other applications.
Without foreknowing the password, we were not able to
create or recover the three Keys. However, we can still apply a brute force attack for retrieving the password. The
password space for the application was 1-16 digits, but we
anticipate that it is highly unlikely that users would choose
a 16 digit password.
Since column password stored the hash value of the
password (hashed twice using MD5 and SHA1 respectively), we reused the same function in the application
for creating a Key-1 to the exhaustive passwords and
then matched the hash value of Key-1 with the record
found in column password. As soon as the hash values matched, Key-1 was used for decrypting Key-2; thus
Key-2 can decrypt Key-3; and ﬁnally Key-3 can decrypt
the media ﬁles that were stored with extension ‘.dat’ in
folder /sdcard/coverme/images/hidden and /sdcard/
coverme/video/hidden respectively.
Even though a brute force attack was a possible solution,
to crack a large password may be time consuming. We also
note that because this application implemented encryption
and decryption in a native library – libNative-aes.so,
it can only be used on an ARM-based Central Processing
Unit (CPU). In order to reuse the library, we implemented
our decryption code in a separate Android project that we
created.

There were two applications we were only able to apply a
brute force attack for retrieving the password. Keeper utilized a salted password hashing function. Coverme did not
store the hash value of the password but the hash value of
the Key that was created by the password. We considered
these two applications relatively more secure because they
allowed a more complex password scheme or employed a
more secure hashing function. Comparing these two applications, Coverme oﬀered a better chance for the brute force
attack because its password was limited to a maximum of
16 digits. Only 2⁄18 vault applications, encrypted the password. However, in both cases the applications generated
their secret Keys through hard coded strings found in the
source code. Lastly, in the column ‘without root’ we also
marked if root privilege was necessary for the recovery as
well as applications that needed a brute force attack were
marked in column ’complex recovery’. In other words, except for these two applications, we can retrieve the hidden
photos and videos from the vault applications all the time
without diﬃculty, under the identiﬁed settings.

6. Summary of ﬁndings
From the case studies, we see that most application developers protected their code using obfuscation and by implementing native libraries as shown in Table 2 in columns
O and N under Code protection. This hindered the process
of reverse engineering the applications. Notwithstanding,
we observed that applications generally adopted similar
security implementations with that could be exploited by
examiners. For example, corresponding to column U, D
and E, Table 2 shows that the photos and videos may
be unencrypted, deconstructed or encrypted. As Table 2
shows, 6⁄18 and 8⁄18 applications only relocated / renamed
the photos and videos respectively. Since the content of
the media ﬁles was not changed, an examiner can easily
recover such ﬁles.
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Figure 5: Secret ﬁles and password encryption in Coverme.

Table 2: Case study summary of results.
Application

Code protection

AppLock
LEO Privacy
Vault
Keeper
Keepsafe
Vaulty
GalleryVault
Audio Manager
Photo Locker
Video Locker
LOCX
Secret AppLock
Pic Lock
HidePhoto
PhotoSafe
Photo Vault
Calculator
Coverme







O
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

N



Photo
U






















D












Video

E

U

H





H




H
H










Count
12/18
5/18
6/18
5/18
7/18
O: JAVA source code of the given application was obfuscated.
U: Photos or videos were found unencrypted.
E: Password, photos or videos were encrypted using a crypto algorithm.
#: Password hash was found in a ﬁle.
R
: Rainbow table attack to crack the password / gesture is possible.
B
: Brute force was the only approach to crack the password.

D



Password
E



H







C

H
H












#

Without Complex
root
recovery
E

SR





B
SR
SR

SR
SR
R
B




H
H







∗

8/18
4/18
6/18
7/18
8/18
2/18
10/18
2/18
N: Application implements the critical functions in a native library.
D: The photos or videos were found being deconstructed.
C: Password was found in cleartext in a ﬁle.
S
: Swap attack to reset password / gesture is possible.
H
: Info for creating the encryption key found hard-coded in source code.
∗
:Password consisted of a maximum of 16 digits.

Full artifact analysis ﬁndings, the results for each vault
application, including the mentioned vulnerabilities is presented in a single Table in Appendix A.

7. Other Vulnerabilities
Beyond retrieving / decrypting the passwords we also
found two other vulnerabilities that can be used for achieving unauthorized access in some applications.
Security e-mail: If the password is forgotten, a user can
submit a request for sending the password or a temporary password to a preset security e-mail. In the applications we tested, Applock (Sec. 5.1) and Pic Lock
(Sec. 5.12) were found storing the cleartext of the security e-mail in in application related ﬁles. Examiners can
modify the e-mail in these ﬁles using a self-owned e-mail
address. Therefore, the user’s passwords may be sent to
that e-mail address instead.
Security answer & question: By correctly answering
the preset security question a user can re-own access to
a vault application. In our test applications, both the
security answer and question were found in cleartext in
Vaulty (Sec. 5.6) and Calculator (Sec. 5.16). Submitting
the answer at the login page allows for unauthorized access to the applications.

8. Discussion
In this work we had to break the security of the vault
applications to recover digital evidence. In fact, this work
has already been used in a real world investigation as mentioned in the introduction. Whilst examining the forensic
feasibility of retrieving data from vault applications, we
also found that although applications were designed as privacy enhancing technologies, researchers and practitioners
with thorough knowledge in reverse engineering and security may still be able to recover evidentiary data from
them.
We learned that even though developers protected applications using techniques like obfuscation, encryption and
the use of native libraries, there may be still security holes
that can be exploited by digital forensic examiners. For
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example, code obfuscation can only hinder examiners without reverse engineering knowledge; native libraries can be
hijacked and reused in decryption; encryption may be bypassed using a swap attack, rainbow table attack or brute
force attack etc. Generally speaking, our findings show
that most security issues in the tested vault applications
were due to (1) storing data locally (on the Android device) without encryption or with simple encryption (2) developers hard-coding constants as encryption Keys, Salts
or other data related to the encryption implementation
and (3) the minimal password space for some applications.
Regarding applications with relatively secure implementations, our testing offers ideas for resolving the aforementioned issues. For example, Keeper stored most of the important information on a server as opposed to local storage
and the password could be made up of all possible characters (see Sec. 5.4). Additionally, to provide better source
code protection, Keeper implemented code obfuscation3
on the source code before compilation. Coverme for example packed the encryption method in a native library (see
Sec. 5.17). These approaches used in combination can effectively increase the time and cost for reverse engineering.
More importantly, a common feature for these relatively
secure applications is that they use user credentials as part
of the encryption process. Lastly it is of note that both
secure applications generated Initialization Vectors / Salts
through randomization.

was limited to only Android vault applications and did not
take into account other mobile operating systems.
10. Conclusion & future work
As shown from our results, vault application developers
indeed code protect their applications, yet through extensive reverse engineering efforts, we are still able to acquire
hidden evidence. While this may not be privacy preserving, the discovered security implementations aid digital
forensic examiners in reconstructing media files that may
be relevant to a case. Future work should examine vault
applications on iOS and also explore network traffic analysis. Work should also test the viability of reconstructing
media files from media that is physically acquired. Future
research should replicate our methods and focus on other
privacy enhancing technologies such as mobile password
vault applications. Lastly, work should explore the feasibility of designing a tool to automate the discovery of
the security implementations of privacy preserving mobile
applications.
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9. Limitations
Our work has limitations. Primarily, artifact analysis
can be conducted only if the targeted mobile device is
qualified for data acquisition that usually requires root
privilege, switched-on USB debugging mode or one of the
requirements in Sec. 2.1. Although this is a limitation for
a potential adversary, we argue that in real investigations,
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Appendix A. Acquisition summary
To provide a fast look up for readers, we summarized
our findings from our artifact analysis which includes important files with critical data such as a user’s password,
the directory of the hidden photos / videos etc. that may
be potentially required by forensic examiners. Ordered
similar to Table 1, Table A.3 contains data about the first
9 applications and Table A.4 contains data about the rest
of the 9 applications.

14

15

Keepsafe

5

/sdcard/.galleryvault_DoNotDelete_1466617307/file/
/data/data/com.thinkyeah.galleryvault/shared_prefs/Kidd.xml

/sdcard/.defaultGallery/DCIM/Camera
/sdcard/DCIM/Camera
/data/data/com.leo.appmaster/shared_prefs/shared_settings.xml
/sdcard/SystemAndroid/Data/MTc1MDU4OQ==/.image
/sdcard/SystemAndroid/Data/MTc1MDU4OQ==/.video
/data/data/com.callpod.android_apps.keeper/databases/<EMAIL>.sql
/data/data/com.callpod.android_apps.keeper/cache/record_files
/sdcard/.keepsafe/manifests/primary
/data/data/com.kii.safe/shared_prefs/com.kii.safe_
preferences.xml
/data/data/com.kii.safe/shared_prefs/com.kii.safe.secmanager.
xml
/sdcard/Documents/Vaulty/data/
/data/data/com.theronrogers.vaultyfree/shared_prefs/com.
theronrogers.vaultyfree_preferences.xml

Security question & answer:<string name="security question">Favorite number</string>
<string name="security answer"> 3 </string>
Deconstructed photos and videos
(SHA1+MD5)
Hashed
password:<string name="LockPin">640171D7E214018FEB3A46182DBCB465B5416B85
0B9B6D6D154E98CE34B3F2E4EF76EAE9</string>
Original name of the media files; path of the deconstructed media files; the wiped 10 bytes for each media
file
Unencrypted photos
Unencrypted videos
Password:<string name="password">9512</string>

32
byte
Key:<string name="aec5a0aa33e25e4c9108939f6d6292c4507b045eAe">4a1dd381b63e324a15ddc7
7e38553ed90136f6102aca62304b32db356f5cf206</string>
Converted photos and unencrypted videos
MD5-hashed password:<string name="password hash">C5ttbRVOmM40s/Lk73bq6Q==</string>

Encrypted media files
Encrypted media files
Password:<string name="master-password">9512</string>

Security e-mail:<string name="mail">vaultapptest@gmail.com</string>
Encrypted photos
Unencrypted videos
Password:<string name="password">9512</string>
Converted photos
Converted videos
Encryption parameter, bcrypt-hashed password

Unencrypted photos
Unencrypted videos
SHA1-hashed pattern lock:<string name=image lock pattern>agYrmzRS42ZAcYGhv5Lqc+ntTEg=</string>

Found

Table A.3: Summary of findings from artifact analysis for vault applications number 1 – 9.

/sdcard/.MySecurityData/dont_remove/<HASH>/.image
/sdcard/.MySecurityData/dont_remove/<HASH>/.video
/data/data/com.domobile.applock/shared_prefs/com.domobile.
applock_preferences.xml

File

<E-MAIL>: The e-mail address previously set up by users.

/data/data/com.thinkyeah.galleryvault/databases/galleryvault.
db
8
Audio Manager
/sdcard/ProgramData/Android/Language/.fr/Pictures/NewAlbum
/sdcard/ProgramData/Android/Language/.fr/Videos/NewAlbum
/data/data/com.hideitpro/shared_prefs/com.hideitpro_
preferences.xml
9
Photo Locker
/sdcard/.PL/PrivatePhoto
Encrypted photos
/sdcard/.PL/.config
Encrypted password
/data/data/com.handyapps.photoLocker/shared_prefs/com.
Encrypted e-mail address
handyapps.photoLocker_preferences.xml
<HASH>: the folder was named with a random string / hash value that may change in different cases

GalleryVault

Keeper

4

7

Vault

3

Vaulty

LEO Privacy

2

6

AppLock

1

Application

Application
10 Video Locker

11 LOCX

12 Secret AppLock

13 Pic Lock

Photo

14 HidePhoto

15 PhotoSafe

16 Private
Vault

File

Encrypted
key:<string name="enc keys pin">uvnUn+GOY90bkZF4q2gvZm98pMVrtDbvJXdHg9NBVfcKYI89v
Iuo2yrcuQOIp4V2mkP383WSkixHZLRK30D3FQ==</string>
Unencrypted photos
Unencrypted videos
Password:<string name="mpass">9512</string>

SHA1-Hashed password:<string name="pin">640171d7e214018feb3a46182dbcb465b5416b85</string>

Encrypted media files

Converted photos
Converted videos
Password:<string name="password">9512</string>

Password:<string name="pass">9512</string>
Security e-mail:<string name="mail">vaultapptest@gmail.com</string>
Unencrypted photos
Unencrypted videos
MD5-hashed password:<string name="password">0b9b6d6d154e98ce34b3f2e4ef76eae9</string>

Unencrypted videos

Unencrypted photos

Unencrypted photos
Unencrypted videos
Password:<string name="pin">9512</string>

Deconstructed photos and videos
MD5-hashed password:<string name="pinp">0b9b6d6d154e98ce34b3f2e4ef76eae9</string>

Encrypted videos
Encrypted password
Encrypted e-mail address

Found

Table A.4: Summary of findings from artifact analysis for vault applications number 10 – 18.
/sdcard/.VL/PrivateVideo
/sdcard/.VL/.config
/data/data/com.handyapps.videolocker/shared_prefs/com.
handyapps.videolocker_preferences.xml
/sdcard/.EncryptedFolder
/data/data/com.cyou.privacysecurity/shared_prefs/com.cyou.
privacysecurity_preferences.xml
/sdcard/.PixnArt12/.Photos
/sdcard/.PixnArt12/.Videos
/data/data/com.amazing.secreateapplock/shared_prefs/
ApplockPreferences.xml
/sdcard/.AndroidLibs/33e75ff09dd601bbe69f351039152189/
.SafeBox1/DefaultFolder/Photos
/sdcard/.AndroidLibs/33e75ff09dd601bbe69f351039152189/
.SafeBox1/Privatevideos/Videos
/data/data/com.xcs.piclock/shared_prefs/Password.xml
/data/data/com.xcs.piclock/shared_prefs/Email.xml
/sdcard/.MySecurityData2/dont_remove/<HASH>/.image
/sdcard/.MySecurityData2/dont_remove/<HASH>/.video
/data/data/com.domobile.hidephoto/shared_prefs/com.domobile.
hidephoto_preferences.xml
/sdcard/.photosafe_DoNotDelete/camera/images
/sdcard/.photosafe_DoNotDelete/camera/videos
/data/data/com.slickdroid.vaultypro/shared_prefs/vaultypro.
xml
/data/data/com.enchantedcloud.photovault/files/media/orig

17 Calculator

/data/data/com.calculator.vault/files/locker1762/Pictures
/data/data/com.calculator.vault/files/locker1762/Videos
/data/data/com.calculator.vault/shared_prefs/com.calculator.
vault_preferences.xml

/data/data/com.enchantedcloud.photovault/shared_prefs/com.
enchantedcloud.photovault_preferences.xml

18 Coverme

Security question & answer:<string name="seq question">Favorite number</string>
<string name="seq answer">3</string>
Encrypted photo
Encrypted video
Value of the password column in table kexinuser; value of the keyByte column in table localAesKey

<HASH>: the folder was named with a random string / hash value that may change in different cases.

/sdcard/coverme/images/hidden
/sdcard/coverme/video/hidden
/data/data/ws.coverme.im/databases/kexin.db
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